Articles Posted in Likelihood Of Confusion

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The applicant in this matter, American Cruise Lines, Inc. is seeking registration of the mark, AMERICAN CONSTELLATION (standard characters) for cruise ship services, transportation of passengers by ship and conducting cruises for others. The Examining Attorney refused the application based on a likelihood of confusion with the registrant’s marks, CONSTELLATION and CELEBRITY CONSTELLATION, both in standard characters for the same cruise ship services. The Examining Attorney requested that the word “American” be disclaimed, but applicant submitted evidence that it had acquired distinctiveness. The claim of distinctiveness was based on use in commerce with four U.S. registrations using the term “American” for cruise ship services. The Examiner accepted the evidence. The applicant voluntarily disclaimed the right to use the term “Constellation”. After refusing the application, the Examining Attorney denied applicant’s request for reconsideration, and the applicant appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the “Board” or the “TTAB”). See In re American Cruise LInes, Inc., 128 USPQ2d 1157 (TTAB 2018) [precedential].

The Examining Attorney as part of its review considered two consent agreements (agreeing to use and registration of the mark AMERICAN CONSTELLATION) submitted by the applicant. Consent agreements are relevant under the du Pont factors. It bears on the market interface between an applicant and a registrant. See our webpage entitled, Resolving Trademark Disputes Without Litigation, for general information on consent agreements, and other means used to resolve these types of disputes.

Typically, the Board addresses the other relevant du Pont factors first, then determines the importance of the consent agreement. Regarding services, those are identical in this matter so there is a presumption that trade channels and classes of consumers are the same, weighing in favor of confusion. Regarding conditions of purchase, applicant submitted affidavit evidence that purchasers of its services exercised a heightened degree of care when purchasing cruise ship services. Affidavit evidence is to be considered probative in nature in an ex parte proceeding, if the affidavit refers to matters known or observed by the affiant.

Regarding similarities between the marks, the marks share the common term, Constellation. This is an arbitrary word used in conjunction with cruise ship services, and will be given broad protection. There is no per se rule that calls for a finding of confusion when a junior user’s mark incorporates the entire mark of the senior user, but certainly this increases the likelihood of confusion. The Board determined the marks were very similar in sound, connotation, appearance and commercial impression.

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A recent decision issued by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB” or the “Board”) finds women’s athletic clothing and bicycle clothing related to electric bicycles for purposes of likelihood of confusion. The Applicant filed a trademark application for the mark LUNACYCLE in standard characters on the Principal Register for electric bicycles and related parts (frames and motors) in international class 12. The Examining Attorney refused the application citing the registration for the mark LUNA in a stylized format, view the stylization here,  for women’s bicycle clothing and clothing accessories in international class 25. Applicant appealed to the Board. See In re Cycles, Serial No. 87132160 (September 18, 2018).

The marks at issue must be considered as a whole and not dissected. More or less weight may be given to a particular aspect of the mark or a particular feature. Therefore, the visual appearance may be enough to conclude the marks are similar, the sounds of the marks when pronounced may be sufficient, the meanings of the marks in and of itself may be adequate to determine that this du Pont factor favors finding a likelihood of confusion. In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Applicant argued that his mark incorporated the word lunacy, but there was no reason to believe consumers purchasing bicycles would perceive the term LUNACYCLE  as “lunacy cle”. The Board pointed out that there is no correct pronunciation for a trademark, and that it is more likely that consumers of bicycles would understand that the mark represented two words Luna and Cycle. Moreover it is likely that the consumer would focus on the arbitrary word Luna and less significance would be given to the generic word cycle.

In regard to the registrant’s mark, even though it contains a word LUNA and design features, the word is considered the dominant element of the mark, since consumers will use the word element to request the goods. Therefore, the term LUNA is the dominant feature of both marks. The rectangular feature of the mark is quite common and thus, not given much weight in the commercial impression, similar to a descriptive word that is disclaimed in a trademark. The Board concluded that the design features in registrant’s mark did not lessen the similarities between the marks, and that the similarities weigh in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.

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It is significant that the Board designated the opinion, In re FabFitFun Inc., Serial No. 86847381 (August 23, 2018), a precedent of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB” or the “Board”). The applicant was seeking to register the mark, I’M SMOKING HOT in standard characters for various cosmetics, make-up, fragrances, nail preparations and toiletries. The Examining Attorney refused the registration based on the registered mark for SMOKIN’ HOT SHOW TIME in standard characters for cosmetics and mascara. Applicant appealed the likelihood of confusion refusal to the Board.

In likelihood of confusion refusals not all du Pont factors are relevant in every case, only certain factors will be considered based on the factual circumstances. The relatedness of the goods will be considered based on how the goods and/or services are identified in the application or registration. See In re Dixie Rests. Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See also, Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In the case at bar, the applicant’s and registrant’s goods include cosmetics. A single good from among a list can sustain a finding of likelihood of confusion. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981). Because the goods are in part identical, the trade channels are presumed to be the same, as well as the classes of purchasers. This du Pont factor weighs in favor of confusion.

Regarding the similarities of the marks, this factor is analyzed while keeping in mind that consumers only remember a general and not a specific impression. Also, another important rule to consider is if two marks share a common term, and the common term is  generic, descriptive or highly suggestive of the named goods or services, then it is less likely consumers will be confused unless the other elements of the mark share additional commonalities. Therefore, analysis of the shared term will play a critical role. Is the shared term, “Smoking Hot” strong or weak?

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Applicant sought to register a standard character mark, SQUEEZE JUICE COMPANY for fruit and vegetable juices, smoothies, juice bar services, smoothie bar services, and cafe services. Applicant received a refusal as to both classes due to a likelihood of confusion with the cited registration, SQUEEZE in stylized lettering with a design of a goblet and a lemon being squeezed above the goblet, compare the marks. The cited registration identified juice bar services and bar services. The applicant appealed the refusal and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the “Board” or the “TTAB”) reversed the refusal. See In re Boston Juicery, LLC, Serial No. 86877537 (August 21, 2018) [not precedential].

Both applications cited “juice bar services” therefore the services are identical in part. In addition, the Examining Attorney produced third-party website evidence that demonstrated that juice is commercially related to juice bar services. Since the services are identical, there is a presumption that the consumers and the trade channels are the same. Therefore, the two du Pont factors, of relatedness of the goods and services, and the similarity of the trade channels favor a finding of likelihood of confusion.

Next the Board evaluated the marks. It held that the design element only emphasized the literal meaning of the term “Squeeze.” The large lettering of the literal term “Squeeze” in Registrant’s mark causes the trademarks to be similar in sound, appearance, meaning and commercial impression. Both marks communicate the message that the goods and/or services will include freshly squeezed juice. This factor also weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion. This case is unusual because once a determination is made that the marks are very similar, the goods and/or services are related, and the trade channels are the same, it is unlikely that the Board will reverse a 2(d) refusal based on the other du Pont factors. Here a single du Pont factor is dispositive, outweighing the other factors.

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A few weeks ago the Board issued a decision in In re Vox Media Inc., Serial No. 87099703 (July 18, 2018) [not presidential]. This case is instructive on multiple general rules that are commonly applied by the Board when determining if there is likelihood of confusion between the sources of two marks. In this case, the Examining Attorney refused the applicant’s mark on the grounds of likelihood of confusion. The decision sets forth rules that practitioners and applicants must keep in mind when clearing trademarks, filing for trademarks, responding to office actions, and lastly when determining if an appeal or an opposition or cancellation should be filed. The marks in the instant case are CODE2040 (the cited registrant’s mark) and CODE (the applicant’s mark).

The services for CODE2040 are: “Educational services, namely, providing internships and apprenticeships in the fields of engineering and technology; educational services, namely, providing workshops, classes, and retreats in the fields of leadership, business, entrepreneurship, technology, engineering, design, job searching, job interviewing skills, and professional networking”.

The services for CODE are: “Educational services, namely, arranging, organizing, and conducting educational events, conferences, seminars, and symposia in the fields of media, technology, business, commerce, consumer products, entrepreneurship, startup businesses, enterprise technology, digital technology, and mobile platforms.”

Goods and services are compared by the identifications set forth in the applications and registrations. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Extrinsic evidence will not be viewed, only the language used to identify the goods and services in the application or registration is relevant. See In re I-Coat Co., LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1730 (TTAB 2018). As long as there is overlap in any one good or service the other goods or services need not be examined, because likelihood of confusion will be found in connection with the class of goods or services with any overlap at all. See In re Wacker Neuson SE, 97 USPQ2d 1408, 1409 (TTAB 2010).

Since the services were identical in part and overlapping, special rules apply. the Board presumes the distribution channels and the classes of consumers are the same. See Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Group, Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In addition, the Board will also require a lesser degree of similarities between the marks. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, in the case at bar, the second and third du Pont factors weigh in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.

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As a trademark practitioner, it is important to carefully review 2(d) reversals by the Board since they occur infrequently. Approximately 90 percent of likelihood of confusion refusals are affirmed. In a recent reversal by the Board, a number of factors contributed to the decision to allow registration, but in my opinion the most significant factors were the differences in the services and the weakness of the term AUBURN. See In re Capital Schools, Serial Nos. 86931396 and 87048675 (April 23, 2018) [not precedential], where the Applicant filed two applications: (1) THE AUBURN SCHOOL in standard characters and (2) CAMP ARISTOTLE AT THE AUBURN SCHOOL in special form. The services included “educational services, namely, providing courses of instruction for children at the early elementary to high school level with special needs; educational services, namely, courses of instructions in the field of math, science, language arts, social studies, foreign language, physical education, music and art for children at the early elementary to high school level with special needs; educational services, namely, providing summer camp programs for children at the early elementary to high school level with special needs”.

The Registrant’s cited marks included word marks and special form marks using the term AUBURN, but the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the “Board”) focused on the standard character mark for AUBURN. This mark was the most similar to the Applicant’s marks. The Registrant’s services include: “education services, namely university and community education, public lectures and workshops, seminars and conferences…” In addition, there are entertainment services relating to sports, theatre, concerts, and dance. The Examining Attorney argued that the Registrant’s mark AUBURN is a famous trademark. To support that position, the Examiner submitted a definition from the American Heritage Dictionary: “Auburn is an Alabama city and the “seat of Auburn University…”

Typically, the Board will take judicial notice of dictionary definitions to determine meanings of words, but because this definition was offered into evidence to prove fame, the Board decided it would not take judicial notice. The Board reasoned that evidence of fame is not usually of record in ex parte proceedings. In the majority of cases, Examining Attorneys do not have access to the types of evidence that can prove fame. Therefore, the Applicant did not know to address this issue in its brief. Moreover, the dictionary definition in and of itself does not prove that the public is aware of the information. The Examining Attorney also argued that the fact that the Registrant owns 111 trademark registrations shows fame. The Board on the same logic disagreed, stating that the public was not likely aware of the number of registrations owned by the Registrant. The Board determined that the mark was not famous.

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In a recent Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“Board” or “TTAB”) decision, the Board reversed the Examiner’s refusal to register the mark YUMMIES and Design (a winking smiley face wearing a crown) for Latin American style food products, namely, processed flavored plantains slices, processed flavored yucca chips, fried pork with salt and chili, potato flakes of different flavors, fired flavored peanuts and baked flavored peanuts and fried corn tortilla snack foods with different flavors. The Examining Attorney cited three different registrations (each with different owners) against the Applicant’s mark. These included: (1) a special format mark for YUMMIES (with a heart shape over the letter “i” in YUMMIES) for candy for consumption on and off the premises; (2) a special format mark for YUMMY’S CHOICE (with a blue ribbon after the term choice) for dairy-based snack foods excluding ice cream, ice milk and frozen yogurt; fruit-based food beverage; oils and fats for food; snack food dips; vegetable-based snack foods; and (3) a standard character mark for SUPER YUMMYS for vegetable-based snack foods; fruit-based snack foods; and milk products excluding ice cream, ice milk and frozen yogurt on the Supplemental Register.

Since The Board affirms approximately ninety percent of the cases appealed in likelihood of confusion refusals, the question to ask is what makes this case different. Before arriving at the answer the Board summarized its method for reviewing these types of refusals. The Board analyzes the facts as they relate to the relevant factors set out in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973) (“du Pont”). Although there are thirteen factors to consider, the two key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the relatedness of the goods or services. The Board in this matter focused on the fact that the shared term between the marks was weak, and that there were differences among the marks.

The Board did not have a lot of evidence to consider for the relatedness of the goods and trade channels. One registration did contain a restriction in trade channels, but the others did not. Since the Applicant failed to present arguments on these factors, the Board concluded that the similarities of the goods, channels of trade and overlap of the classes of consumers weighed in favor of finding confusion. The Board moved on to review the marks, and the marks have to be evaluated in their entireties in connection with visual appearance, sound, meaning and commercial impression. Consumers will retain a general and not a specific impression of a trademark. A good test is to observe a mark for five to ten seconds, then to close your eyes, and think of what you remember about the mark.

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The USPTO and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB” or the “Board”) have been trending towards refusing marks and affirming refusals where the trademarks are legally identical, and where the goods are complementary, or in other cases where the goods are intrinsically related. The burden is on the Applicant to adopt a mark that is not confusingly similar to another brand in its industry or in a related industry. Where the trademarks are identical or nearly identical, a lesser degree of relatedness between the goods is necessary to support a finding of likely confusion. See a recent Board decision, In re Spin80, Inc., U.S. Serial No. 87116915 (January 31, 2018) [not precedential], where a refusal was affirmed for the marks CODEGREEN for nutritional supplements in pill and powder form, and CODE GREEN for fruit beverages and vegetable based food beverages.

The Board concluded that the marks were indistinguishable in appearance, and identical in sound, meaning and commercial impression. Any applicant that adopts an identical mark or a nearly identical mark is immediately at a disadvantage, since a different standard will apply in the likelihood of confusion analysis. A lesser degree of similarity between the goods or services will suffice. The Examining Attorney produced evidence of third-party websites. These five websites showed that one mark was used in connection with both fruit and juice beverages, and nutritional supplements in a pill form. The Examiner also submitted evidence of 11 use-based third-party registrations that identified both fruit beverages and nutritional supplements in pill form. This evidence demonstrates that the goods may emanate from the same source. Based on this evidence, the Board determined that the goods were related, and that consumers could mistakenly believe the goods originated from the same source.

Upon reviewing the identifications of the Applicant and Registrant, the Board noted there were no restrictions indicated. This means that there is an assumption that the goods travel in all the normal and usual channels of trade. The Board held that the trade channels and classes of consumers overlapped. The refusal to register the mark was affirmed.

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Once an Examining Attorney refuses a trademark application on the grounds of likelihood of confusion (2(d) grounds), it is unlikely the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB” or the “Board”) will reverse the refusal. Statistics demonstrate that approximately nine out of ten times, the Board will affirm a likelihood of confusion refusal. However, the Board reversed the refusal in the case that will be discussed in this blog, and you can decide if you agree with the Board or the Examining Attorney on this matter. The Applicant applied for the mark FIT IN YOUR GENES in standard characters for among other services, a weight loss program. The Examiner cited the registration FITGENES and Design (the design consisting of a letter V upright and one upside intersecting with the upright letter V) also for weight loss services in part, as grounds for a likelihood of confusion refusal. See In re Druz, Serial No. 86614598 (January 22, 2018) [not precedential].

The Applicant argued that the design element in the mark, the intersected letter Vs, was sufficient to distinguish the two marks. The Board disagreed with this point. It is well settled law that when evaluating a standard character mark and a composite mark, generally speaking, the word element will be considered the dominant element of the mark, and the indicator of source. The rationale for this general rule is that the word element of the mark is the portion of the trademark that consumers will use to refer to the services. Thus, if the literal elements of two marks are similar enough to create a likelihood of confusion, adding a design element to one mark, will not generally distinguish the trademarks.

Regarding the literal portions of the marks, on the surface it appears that there are similarities between the marks that may cause confusion. However, the Board found otherwise. In comparing the trademarks, the following factors are considered, appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. Trademark law aims to protect consumers by avoiding confusion in the marketplace upon encountering two similar trademarks for related goods or services. In this case, both marks include the terms, “fit” and “genes” and therefore, the appearance of the two marks is similar. But the connotations and the commercial impressions are different. The Board took judicial notice of the definition of the term “fit” from the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, both as a verb and as an adjective. It also noted the definition of the term “gene”.

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Since the precedential decision of  In re Bay State Brewing Co., 119 USPQ2d 1958 (TTAB 2016), the Board has more carefully reviewed Consent Agreements. Some may say the TTAB has since been scrutinizing Consent Agreements, seeking to find very detailed reasons for why confusion will not occur between two sources in the marketplace. For more on the influential case of In re Bay State Brewing Co., see our blog post entitled, A Recent TTAB Decision Impacting Consent And Coexistence Agreements. After the issuance of this decision, other decisions followed in the trend of rejecting Consent Agreements. The latest in this line is In re 8-Brewing LLC, Serial No.86760527 (October 30, 2017) [not precedential]. This decision affirmed the refusal of the Applicant’s mark and stated that the restrictions set forth in the parties’ Consent Agreement would not eliminate confusion in the market place.

8-Brewing LLC, (the “Applicant”) was seeking registration on the Principal Register of the mark, 8-BIT ALEWORKS, for beer in standard characters. The mark was refused due to a likelihood of confusion with the registered mark 8 BIT Brewing Company (a word mark and also a design mark with the same literal terms) for beer, ale, lager, stout and porter, malt liquor and pale beer. The parties submitted a Consent Agreement as part of the record of evidence. A Consent Agreement is evaluated under du Pont factor ten, the market interface between the Applicant and the owner of a prior mark.

The Board commenced its review with the goods identified in the trademark application and registrations. Part of the parties’ identifications is identical, “beer”. Because there is an overlapping identical good, it is presumed that the channels of trade and classes of purchasers are the same. Another presumption that attaches when the goods are identical is the “degree of similarity necessary to support a conclusion of likely confusion declines”. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The relatedness of the goods as described in the application and registrations, weigh in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.

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